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課程名稱 |
專題研究：樂透悖論
Independent Study: The Lottery Paradox |
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開課學期 |
110-1 |
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授課對象 |
文學院 哲學研究所 |
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授課教師 |
鄧敦民 |
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課號 |
Phl8833 |
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課程識別碼 |
124 D2540 |
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班次 |
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學分 |
1.0 |
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全/半年 |
半年 |
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必/選修 |
選修 |
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上課時間 |
星期五2(9:10~10:00) |
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上課地點 |
哲研討室二 |
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備註 |
本課程中文授課,使用英文教科書。請先徵得授課教師及申請者同意後，始得選課。
限博士班 且 限本系所學生(含輔系、雙修生)
總人數上限：3人 |
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課程簡介影片 |
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核心能力關聯 |
核心能力與課程規劃關聯圖 |
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課程大綱
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為確保您我的權利,請尊重智慧財產權及不得非法影印
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課程概述 |
我們普遍同意我們並不知道手上的樂透不會中獎，但許多日常命題（ordinary proposition）都會蘊含如此的「樂透命題」（lottery proposition），於是這威脅到了我們對於日常命題的知識。值得注意的是，樂透命題比常見的懷疑論劇本還更有辯證上的效力（dialectically effective），畢竟許多哲學家會嘗試以各種方式來主張我們可以知道自己不是桶中腦。這個問題在近年的文獻中受到相當廣泛的討論，而本專題課將聚焦在關於「封閉性原則」（closure principle）的議題，探討「脈絡論」（contextualism）與「不變論」（invariantism）這兩條進路。 |
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課程目標 |
本課程目標在於使學生
(1) 完整掌握關於樂透悖論的議題；
(2) 對於主要的兩個立場有些基本的理解；
(3) 發展自己的觀點。 |
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課程要求 |
每週閱讀指定內容，並寫作短文，定期討論。 |
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預期每週課後學習時數 |
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Office Hours |
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指定閱讀 |
Brown, Jessica (2008). Knowledge and practical reason. Philosophy Compass 3 (6):1135-1152.
Brown, Jessica (2012). Practial reasoning, decision theory and anti-intellectualism. Episteme 9 (1):1-20.
Cohen, Stewart (2004). Knowledge, assertion, and practical reasoning. Philosophical Issues 14 (1):482–491.
Douven, Igor & Williamson, Timothy (2006). Generalizing the lottery paradox. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (4):755-779.
Hacking, I. (2001). An Introduction to Probability and Inductive Logic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hawthorne, J. and Bovens, L. (1999). "The Preface, the Lottery, and the Logic of Belief", Mind, 108: 241–264.
Hawthorne, John (2002). Lewis, the lottery and the preface. Analysis 62 (3):242–251.
Hawthorne, John (2003). Knowledge and Lotteries. Oxford University Press.
Ichikawa, Jonathan (2011). Quantifiers and epistemic contextualism. Philosophical Studies 155 (3):383-398.
Lewis, D. (1996). "Elusive Knowledge", Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74, pp. 549–67.
Nelkin, Dana K. (2000). The lottery paradox, knowledge, and rationality. Philosophical Review 109 (3):373-409.
Reed, Baron (2008). Fallibilism and the Lottery paradox.
Reed, Baron (2010). A defense of stable invariantism. Noûs 44 (2):224-244. Proceedings of the xxii World Congress of Philosophy 53:217-225.
Smith, Donald (2005). Knowledge and lotteries. Philosophical Books 46 (2):123-131.
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參考書目 |
Brown, Jessica (2008). Knowledge and practical reason. Philosophy Compass 3 (6):1135-1152.
Brown, Jessica (2012). Practial reasoning, decision theory and anti-intellectualism. Episteme 9 (1):1-20.
Cohen, Stewart (2004). Knowledge, assertion, and practical reasoning. Philosophical Issues 14 (1):482–491.
Douven, Igor & Williamson, Timothy (2006). Generalizing the lottery paradox. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (4):755-779.
Hacking, I. (2001). An Introduction to Probability and Inductive Logic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hawthorne, J. and Bovens, L. (1999). "The Preface, the Lottery, and the Logic of Belief", Mind, 108: 241–264.
Hawthorne, John (2002). Lewis, the lottery and the preface. Analysis 62 (3):242–251.
Hawthorne, John (2003). Knowledge and Lotteries. Oxford University Press.
Ichikawa, Jonathan (2011). Quantifiers and epistemic contextualism. Philosophical Studies 155 (3):383-398.
Lewis, D. (1996). "Elusive Knowledge", Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74, pp. 549–67.
Nelkin, Dana K. (2000). The lottery paradox, knowledge, and rationality. Philosophical Review 109 (3):373-409.
Reed, Baron (2008). Fallibilism and the Lottery paradox.
Reed, Baron (2010). A defense of stable invariantism. Nous 44 (2):224-244. Proceedings of the xxii World Congress of Philosophy 53:217-225.
Smith, Donald (2005). Knowledge and lotteries. Philosophical Books 46 (2):123-131. |
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評量方式
(僅供參考) |
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No. |
項目 |
百分比 |
說明 |
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1. |
專文寫作 |
100% |
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週次 |
日期 |
單元主題 |
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第1週 |
9/24 |
Introducing the puzzle |
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第2週 |
10/01 |
Assertion, probability, practical reasoning |
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第3週 |
10/08 |
Single-premise closure and Multi-premise closure |
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第4週 |
10/15 |
Puzzles connected to closure |
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第5週 |
10/22 |
Closure and junk knowledge |
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第6週 |
10/29 |
Easy knowledge and closure |
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第7週 |
11/05 |
Question-sensitivity |
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第8週 |
11/12 |
Contextualism and lotteries |
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第9週 |
11/19 |
Knowledge and objective chance |
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第10週 |
11/26 |
The threat from conjunction introduction |
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第11週 |
12/03 |
Skeptical invariantism |
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第12週 |
12/10 |
Error theory |
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第13週 |
12/17 |
The successful Moorean |
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第14週 |
12/24 |
Simple moderate invariantism |
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第15週 |
12/31 |
Sensitive moderate invariantism |
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第16週 |
1/07 |
From ascriber-dependence to subject-dependence |
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第17週 |
1/14 |
Salience |
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第18週 |
1/21 |
Misleading evidence |
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